

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 28, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: R. T. Davis/ T. D. Burns
SUBJECT: SRS Report for Week Ending September 28, 2001

HLW Tank 19 Closure: Based on original estimates of Tank 19 heel contents, WSRC concluded that heel removal would not be required. Subsequent discovery of mechanical problems with the “reel-tape” level indication equipment, which resulted in an underestimation of the actual heel volume by about a factor of two, has led to a re-examination of the decision not to remove the tank heel. To support the re-examination, current efforts are underway to obtain both “grab” and “core” samples from the tank heel. These will be taken to SRTC for further characterization analyses. WSRC indicated that the tanktop will need to be drilled to obtain the new core samples.

The current schedule has the samples being taken in October and the SRTC characterization analyses being completed by the end of November. To minimize potential impacts to the tank closure schedule, WSRC plans to prepare for a heel removal campaign in parallel with the sample and analysis effort.

Site Authorization Basis Initiatives: As part of an ongoing effort to balance appropriate levels of conservatism with fiscal and operational realities, WSRC has been pursuing several revisions to their site Conduct of Engineering and Technical Support manual (WSRC E7 manual). Foremost among these include relaxation of prescriptive “stair-step” accident frequency considerations with regard to functional classification of equipment, clarification of functional classification expectations for equipment which monitors system or process initial conditions relevant to safety, and guidelines on appropriate use and applicability of statistical analysis methodology.

The general position in the revision is that equipment monitoring initial conditions will not require safety class or safety significant functional classification unless it is part of a credited preventive or mitigative action sequence, its failure is considered an accident initiator, or violation of the monitored parameter is considered an accident initiator. Also, the use of statistical methodology under the revision is limited to the comparative assessment of control options for performing safety functions. The requisite functional classifications will continue to be determined using bounding analyses. Resolution of both WSRC and DOE-SR comments continues, with issuance of the revision expected in early October.

2H Evaporator: This week, DOE-SR commenced its ORR for restart of the 2H Evaporator. It is scheduled to be complete by October 6, 2001. The target date for evaporator restart remains October 12, 2001.